UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
The Traders drew attention to the length of time since the Relevant Period and submitted that the delays by the Authority in its investigation and in particularising its case have resulted in unfairness and prejudice.
On 26 July 2016, the Exchange sent a letter to Mizuho Securities USA Inc (“MSUSA”) (which was the member firm on the Exchange) querying the trading rationale for two identified episodes of trading which had taken place on 29 June 2016 (the “Eurex Letter”). MSUSA forwarded this letter to MHI on 28 July 2016. MHI then interviewed Mr Urra (on 29 July and 5 August 2016) and Mr Sheth (on 3 and 9 August 2016) before responding to Eurex on 22 August 2016.
MHI’s Compliance team continued its own review of the trading activity (as part of which it interviewed Mr Lopez on 29 September 2016) and produced a report on “A Review of European Government Bond Desk Dealing Practice on the EUREX Exchange” in October 2016 (the “MHI Compliance Report”). That report was sent to the Traders on 13 October 2016 and they were informed by MHI that they would be the subject of a disciplinary investigation in relation to orders for Futures placed on Eurex. MHI sent this report to the Authority (which had already been informed of the Eurex Letter).
The matter was referred to MHI’s Head of Human Resources (“HR”) for a disciplinary investigation. MHI held further meetings with each Trader - Mr Urra and Mr Lopez were each interviewed on 18 October 2016, Mr Sheth was interviewed on 14 October 2016, and there were disciplinary meetings with each Trader on 2 November 2016.
On 10 November 2016, MHI’s CFO wrote to each of the Traders to inform them of the outcome of the disciplinary process. MHI took no disciplinary action against Mr Lopez. MHI issued a first warning to Mr Sheth in respect of his “poor practice” in placing multiple orders instead of amending existing orders and a final warning to Mr Urra in respect of his management of Mr Sheth. There were no findings of market abuse against any of the Traders.
Mr George submitted that the Authority’s investigation then progressed at an exceptionally slow pace:
The Authority had been sent the MHI Compliance Report in October 2016 but it did not appoint investigators until 16 March 2017.
The Authority then requested the Eurex trading data on 25 April 2017, with the assistance of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority of Germany (“BaFin”), which was received on 19 September 2017.
The Authority didn’t interview the Traders until the first half of 2018 - Mr Lopez on 18 and 19 January 2018, Mr Sheth on 15 March 2018 and Mr Urra on 16 April 2018.
It was not until April 2019 that the Authority indicated that it intended to engage an independent expert. They instructed their first expert, Mr Santacana, in June 2019, whose expert report was then produced on 30 September 2020.
The Authority served Annotated Warning Notices on the Traders in October 2020.
The Traders each provided a response in December 2020, but the Enforcement and Market Oversight Division (“EMO”) didn’t serve its Enforcement Submissions Document on each of the Traders until 19 May 2021.
The Warning Notices were issued to each Trader on 16 July 2021.
The RDC hearings took place in March 2022.
The Authority issued its Decision Notices for each of the Traders on 31 October 2022.
The Traders referred these matters to the Tribunal on 28 November 2022, and the references were heard from 27 January to 14 February 2025. Mr George referred to the decision of the Tribunal in Seiler, Whitestone and Raitzin v Financial Conduct Authority [2023] UKUT 133 (TCC) (“Seiler UT”) where the Tribunal had (at [59]) described the delays as unsatisfactory and recorded that in that case the lapse of time between the events in question and the hearing of the references was longer than any other comparable proceedings in the experience of that Tribunal, noting that such record has now been surpassed in these proceedings.
Alongside their submissions in relation to what they described as the slow progress of the Authority towards the issue of Decision Notices, the Traders drew the Tribunal’s attention to how the Authority’s case has been particularised and submitted that the Authority’s failure to particularise the Instance Pool at an early stage has also hindered the Traders’ ability to recollect the specific trading activity on which the Authority now relies:
The Eurex Letter asked about two Instances, which are now referred to as F174 and F176.
The Traders were interviewed by the Authority in 2018, but at that time the Authority put a limited number of Instances to them – they had been provided with bundles containing trading data for approximately 11 Instances each, which were the subject of the interviews.
The Traders submitted that the first time the Traders were told in any detail of the allegations against them was when the Authority issued the Annotated Warning Notices in October 2020.
The Authority’s first statements of case were served in February 2023, which annexed a table listing the 233 Instances, of which only a small number were particularised.
On 2 February 2024 the Authority revised the number of Instances relied upon against each Trader and provided “further particulars” for each alleged Instance of market abuse.
Following a contested application which was determined at a case management hearing on 20 June 2024, the Tribunal ordered the Authority to: (1) identify ten individual instances per Trader and ten Multi Trader Instances (these being the Specified Instances); (2) provide narratives detailing each Specified Instance; and (3) limit cross-examination of the Traders to these Specified Instances and any further Instances or trading activity outside of the Instance Pool identified by the Traders.
The Authority identified the Specified Instances on 4 July 2024 and filed narratives on 18 July 2024.
Mr Shivji submitted that this is a particularly technical and complex matter and the Authority had sought to conduct a thorough and fair investigation. It was inevitable that it was always going to take some time for the Authority to analyse the data - the Authority received approximately 16.5m lines of data from Eurex alone. The Authority submitted that the relevance of the delay must be set in its proper context, saying the Traders’ central complaint was understood to be that the passage of time meant that they have difficulty recalling what happened and why; this was described as “uncontroversial” by the Authority. On the facts, Mr Shivji submitted that even if the Authority had been able to move much more quickly – which was not accepted – this would not have improved the evidence before the Tribunal. The Traders acknowledged that their recollection of the specific trades was poor even in September and October 2016; and on any view the hearing before the Tribunal would be taking place years after the end of the Relevant Period.
The hearing took place over a period of three weeks. Having heard the submissions of the parties, the evidence of the Traders and the two experts, during the course of which the Tribunal was taken to a large amount of data in relation to the trading activity, the Electronic RFQs received by the desk and the cash bond transactions which were executed - which was itself only a small portion of that which was in the hearing bundle - the Tribunal accepts that a thorough investigation would take time. However, whilst we have not heard from any witnesses from the Authority who could have explained the progress of the various steps in the investigation (an approach which was itself criticised by the Traders in their opening submissions), the Tribunal considers that there were some delays that are unexplained and are not a consequence of the complexity of the underlying activity. Those which potentially had the most significance are those which occurred in the early stages, in particular:
the delay between the Authority receiving the MHI Compliance Report in October 2016 (having already been informed of the receipt of the Eurex Letter at the end of July or beginning of August 2016) and appointing investigators in March 2017, which in turn delayed the request for Eurex trading data and contributed to the Traders only being interviewed by the Authority in 2018; and
the delay in deciding to engage an independent expert and the period of time which followed until production of the first expert report in September 2020, ie more than four years after the end of the Relevant Period.
Progress thereafter was not swift. But it is these delays which meant that it was more than four years after the Relevant Period that the Authority served the Annotated Warning Notices on the Traders, and whilst the Authority has subsequently amended the number of Instances on which it relies against each Trader, it was not until this time that the Traders would have understood the breadth of the case being made against them and, importantly, that the Authority was not only challenging whether the Traders were pursuing a legitimate trading strategy but also alleging that they had each (individually and together) engaged in market abuse on a large number of occasions throughout a period of two months.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions