UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
F30 and F31 involved Mr Urra and Mr Lopez. The Authority’s case was that in F30 Mr Urra had placed a Large Order to help facilitate the trading of Mr Lopez’s Small Order, was “caught out” when 39 lots of his Large Order traded, then tried to sell those lots unsuccessfully. Mr Urra then tried again to sell those lots, with them being the Small Order in F31, at which point Mr Lopez had helped by placing a Large Order.
The Tribunal was repeatedly referred to these two Instances, including in the context of the time of day at which the Large Orders were placed, that Mr Urra’s Large Order started to fill in F30 and he cancelled it and immediately tried to sell the 39 lots he had acquired, and the coincidences in timing.
The only Large Order in F30 was placed by Mr Urra. The trading activity was as follows:
At 17.39.34.225, Mr Urra placed a Small Order to sell nine lots, iceberged to five, for 141.92.
That did not trade, and at 17.39.45.444 Mr Urra placed a Large Order to buy 500 lots for 141.89.
The Small Order filled.
At 17.39.54.403, Mr Lopez then placed a Small Order to sell five lots, iceberged to one, for 141.93.
Mr Urra amended the price of his Large Order, increasing it to 141.90, and then increasing it further to 141.91 at 17.39.56.110.
Mr Lopez’s Small Order filled at 17.39.59.350.
Mr Urra reduced the price of his Large Order to 141.90 at 17.39.59.393, 0.043 seconds after Mr Lopez’s Small Order filled.
39 lots of Mr Urra’s Large Order traded, and he cancelled the remaining 461 lots at 17.40.01.104.
At 17.40.26.885 Mr Urra placed an order to sell 39 lots for 141.91, reduced the price to 141.90 and then cancelled the order.
Mr Shivji submitted that:
Mr Urra had not intended to buy Futures at this time of day – having placed an order to buy 500 lots, he cancelled that order as soon as it started to trade and then placed an order to sell the 39 lots which had traded in that Instance; and
Mr Urra’s amendments to the price of his Large Order, moving it away from the touch as soon as the Small Order traded, must have been coordinated.
Mr Urra and Mr Lopez denied any collaboration - Mr Urra’s evidence was that something was happening in the market here, and Mr Lopez said all he could see was his Small Order to sell five lots and he could not see Mr Urra’s activity.
F31 then started at 17.45.10.137 and involved Mr Urra placing a Small Order (to sell the 39 lots from F30), with Mr Urra and Mr Lopez both placing Large Orders (of 499 and 400 lots respectively). It was a long instance, of 9 minutes and 50 seconds. The trading activity was as follows:
At 17.45.10.137 Mr Urra placed a Small Order to sell 39 lots, iceberged to four, for 141.93.
Mr Urra placed a Large Order to buy 499 lots at 141.80 nearly 12 seconds later. Mr Urra adjusted the price of this Large Order to 141.82, 141.83, 141.84, then back down to 141.83, 141.82, 141.81 then 141.80. These price changes take place across 27 seconds.
At 17.46.21.136 Mr Lopez then placed a Large Order to buy 400 lots for 141.84.
Less than 20 seconds later, Mr Urra amended the price of his Small Order, to 141.92 then 141.91. The second price reduction is at 17.46.40.705.
At 17.46.45.359 Mr Urra then started a series of amendments to the price of his Large Order, to 141.81 and up to 141.88 and then reducing back to 141.81, all in increments of 0.01.
At 17.47.17.885 Mr Lopez increased the price of his Large Order to 141.85 and then to 141.86 almost eight seconds later.
The following second Mr Urra then started to amend the price of his Large Order again, to 141.82, 141.83, 141.84 and then 141.85.
The Small Order started to trade at 17.47.33.255 at the price of 141.91.
At 17.47.39.633 Mr Urra amended the price of the remaining 15 lots of the Small Order to 141.92.
Less than two seconds later Mr Urra started amending the price of his Large Order, increasing it to 141.86, 141.87, 141.88, 141.89, 141.90 and then back to 141.89.
The Small Order started to trade again.
Mr Urra continued reducing the price of the Large Order, to 141.88, 141.87, 141.86, 141.85 and 141.84.
Mr Urra reduced the price of the Small Order, which continued to fill, and at 17.48.11.360 the final three lots of the Small Order were placed on the market.
Mr Lopez and Mr Urra cancelled their Large Orders at 17.48.12.755 and 17.48.12.890 respectively.
Mr Urra increased the price of his Small Order and it filled at 17.55.00.136.
Mr Urra and Mr Lopez denied collaborating, with their evidence being that they had each placed their Large Orders for their own Trading Strategies, they did want to trade their Large Orders, with Mr Lopez adding that something was going on in the market, and it may have been linked to an OECD report.
The Tribunal records that:
Mr Urra and Mr Lopez were, on their account, pursuing different Trading Strategies. Mr Lopez was placing orders with the aim of predicting MHI’s client flow, whereas Mr Urra was going against MHI’s client flow in anticipation that the market maker with whom the client had traded would then be selling Futures. Yet the pursuit of these different strategies led to them both placing Large Orders in the market in the same direction at the same time.
The price adjustments to Mr Urra’s Large Order were not keeping the order at a certain level away from the touch; he was moving the Large Order towards it and then away again, with the “peak” getting closer to the touch each time.
The result of this activity was that at 17.48 on a Friday evening the Desk had orders in the market for 899 lots. There was very little visible volume on the Replay graphs, particularly on the buy-side. On the basis of all of the evidence before us, we do not accept that Mr Lopez could reasonably have expected that he would win a cash trade of €40-50m of ten-year bonds at this time of day; or that Mr Urra could reasonably have anticipated that another market maker would be needing to sell a large number of Futures following a cash trade.
If Mr Lopez had bought 400 lots at this price, he would have been sitting on a loss of €112,000 on Monday morning’s opening.
The two Large Orders were cancelled 0.135 seconds apart.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions