UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
We heard evidence from the Traders, each of whom had provided witness statements and were cross-examined by Mr Shivji on behalf of the Authority and, in the case of Mr Urra, also by Mr Bailin on behalf of Mr Sheth. The latter cross-examination was confined to whether Mr Urra recalled either showing the Information Discovery Strategy to Mr Sheth and/or a subsequent discussion with Mr Sheth in relation to which Mr Sheth’s evidence was that he expressed his frustration that the strategy was not working.
In cross-examination Mr Shivji put the Authority’s case to each of the Traders, both in general terms by reference to the Authority’s allegations that their Trading Strategies were fabricated, and specifically by reference to some of the Instances and other trading activity to which the Traders had referred in their witness statements. The Tribunal does not at this stage set out its conclusions on the credibility of each of the Traders. They each denied market abuse, giving evidence that they had an intention to trade all of their Large Orders and did not collaborate to commit an abusive scheme. The Tribunal’s assessment of that evidence is made in the light of all of the evidence.
The Tribunal also heard evidence from Mr Fernando Fernandez-Maquieira, a broker in the EGB market, who had provided a witness statement and was cross-examined by Ms Hassell-Hart on behalf of the Authority. Mr Fernandez-Maquieira had worked with traders for 20 years and Mr Urra had been a client of his. He had first met Mr Urra whilst Mr Urra was at Credit Suisse, and Mr Urra remained a client during his time at MHI between 2012 and 2019. Mr Fernandez-Maquieira’s role was to help the traders find buyers and sellers for their orders. He gave evidence in relation to order size (both in the EGB futures market generally and sizes transacted by MHI), the splitting of orders and his opinion on the plausibility of Mr Urra’s Trading Strategy. The Tribunal accepts that Mr Fernandez-Maquieira gave his evidence honestly and sought to assist the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal has not relied on his evidence when making findings of fact as his evidence was given by reference to the long period of time during which he worked with Mr Urra and he was not able to be specific about order sizes by reference to particular periods of time as he no longer has access to the data relating to his transactions with MHI during the Relevant Period.
Mr Simon Virciglio, who is a former broker in the EGB market, had provided a witness statement in the context of Mr Urra’s reference and was willing to attend and be cross-examined but the Authority, Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth agreed he did not need to attend for cross-examination. Mr Virciglio’s evidence was essentially a character reference for Mr Urra, referring to him being held in high regard, straightforward, fair, meticulous and focused on his trading strategies. He also described both Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth as straightforward and honest. It was common ground between the parties that none of the Traders had previously been subject to any compliance investigation or disciplinary proceedings and, with no disrespect intended to Mr Virciglio, the Tribunal places no weight on his evidence.
The Tribunal also had the benefit of expert evidence from:
Mr Stephen Creaturo, who is a Financial Markets Advisor at Valere Capital Partners LLP, and had been instructed as an expert by the Authority; and
Mr Andrew Kasapis, who is a Senior Director at Kroll Advisory Ltd, and had been jointly instructed by the Traders as an expert.
Mr Creaturo and Mr Kasapis both produced expert reports for the Tribunal and the Tribunal was also taken to the expert reports which Mr Kasapis had prepared before the RDC. Mr Creaturo and Mr Kasapis both addressed the matters identified in the agreed list of issues, namely:
What impact, if any, would the Instances identified in the Instance Pool have on the market (considered by reference to the impression and/or signal as to the supply or demand for, or price, of BTP Futures that the trading instances would give or be likely to give to the market, if any)?
Is the trading activity (both in the individual trader and the multi-trader Instances) identified in the Instance Pool explained by/consistent with an intention to pursue the alleged trading strategies identified by each Trader?
Whether the large orders outside the Instance Pool are explained by/consistent with an intention to pursue the alleged Trading Strategies.
Are the Specified Instances representative of the Instance Pool as a whole?
The evidence in the hearing bundles included:
trading activity in relation to the 233 Instances in the Instance Pool as illustrated in Appendix 2 (albeit that the narrative was only provided for the Specified Instances);
daily price graph (London time) for Futures on each trading day in the Relevant Period (which had been exhibited by Mr Lopez) - the price movements for each day were shown on a single page, with 15 minute intervals marked;
list of trades in BTPs entered into by the Desk between 1 June and 31 July 2016;
Electronic RFQs received by the Desk in BTPs between 1 June and 31 July 2016;
a list of the 93 RFQs that came into the Desk during the Relevant Period which would have required hedging with a Futures order of 200 lots or more (which had been exhibited by Mr Lopez);
floor plans for the relevant part of MHI’s offices during the Relevant Period;
records of training undertaken by the Traders, with copies of slides from some of that training;
the MHI Compliance Report (as defined below);
transcripts of the Authority’s interviews with other employees of MHI namely Christian Heiberg (Head of Fixed Income Trading), Dinesh Joshi (Head of Compliance), Anthony Algeo (Executive Director, Compliance), Graham Halliday (COO Front Office), Mehdi Barouti and James Hill (the other traders on the Desk); and
materials produced by the Authority, including summaries of data obtained by the Authority from the Exchange in relation to orders placed by other market participants (the “SMARTS data”).
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions