UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Conclusions on Market Abuse
Conclusions on Market Abuse
The Authority alleges that the Traders engaged in an abusive trading strategy to commit market abuse, which involved them placing Large Orders that gave or were likely to give a false or misleading impression and/or signal as to the supply of or demand for Futures; and they did not intend to trade these Large Orders. The Authority alleges that this conduct was deliberate, dishonest and lacked integrity.
We have set out the relevant law, including the focus in Burford on the subjective intentions of the relevant trader. The law relating to market abuse does not contain any requirement that the conduct be dishonest. In the Decision Notices the Authority’s conclusion was that the Traders had deliberately engaged in market abuse, and this conduct was dishonest and lacked integrity, and this has been the Authority’s pleaded case throughout these references. The Tribunal therefore reaches conclusions not only on whether each Trader committed market abuse, but also whether they were dishonest by reference to the test in Ivey, namely ascertaining (subjectively) the actual state of each Trader’s knowledge or belief as to the facts; and determining whether their conduct was honest or dishonest by applying (objective) ordinary standards.
We have reached our conclusions on the basis of all of our findings of fact and our evaluation of all of the evidence and submissions before us. We have not found it necessary to refer to all of the evidence or all of our evaluation of that evidence in setting out our conclusions. The Tribunal is mindful of the seriousness of the allegations which have been made by the Authority and the consequences for the Traders of its decision; and that the burden of proof is on the Authority.
Before setting out our conclusions in respect of each of Mr Urra, Mr Sheth and Mr Lopez (in that order for this purpose), we consider it important to reiterate the following:
The Authority’s pleaded case is in relation to the placing of the Large Orders in the Instance Pool; those Large Orders are said to have been placed to facilitate the execution of the Small Orders. The Traders have criticised the Authority throughout for not taking account of their full trading activity in the Relevant Period, ie the activity outside the Instance Pool which includes the placing of Non-Instance large orders (including the Lone Large Orders). This submission needs to be considered in context. The sizing used for the categorisation of orders as being large or small (or “Large” or “Small” if within the Instance Pool) means that, when taken together, they capture all of the orders placed by the Traders during the Relevant Period. To put this another way, there is no category of “medium-sized” orders in Futures for this purpose.
The Large Orders and the Non-Instance large orders are all the orders of 200 lots or more placed by Mr Lopez, or 250 lots or more placed by Mr Urra and Mr Sheth (except where they placed orders in Multi Trader Instances in which case the lower threshold of 200 lots was applied) in the Relevant Period. Where we have referred to the execution rates of such orders placed by the Traders in comparison with those of other market participants, where other market participants placed 2,406 large orders of 200 lots or more, 72.28% of which fully traded, this is a comparison being drawn with all of the Traders’ orders of such size in the Relevant Period. Only six of Mr Urra’s 175 large orders traded (five in part and one in full); and none of Mr Lopez’s 88 large orders or Mr Sheth’s 202 large orders traded at all.
The small orders (including the Small Orders) placed by all three Traders were sized by reference to the market making business which the Desk was actually doing. They were (partial) hedges for cash trades (recognising that Futures were not a perfect offsetting hedge to a cash trade) and/or re-positioning the Traders’ books.
We have concluded that the Large Orders were each likely to give the impression or signal of significantly increased supply or demand, and the most likely market reaction would be for the market to move in the opposite direction to the Large Orders, ie towards the Small Orders. We found that a Trader placing the Large Order in these circumstances would have known of this likelihood.
On the basis of the trading activity in the Instances, in particular the overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders, the length of time for which the Large Orders were live and the timing of the cancellation of the Large Orders after the Small Orders filled, the Tribunal accepts that it could reasonably be inferred that the Large Orders were placed to facilitate the execution of the Small Orders.
However, there are aspects of the trading activity during the Relevant Period which the Authority’s case does not explain, including the Lone Large Orders and the Overlapping Small Orders. This activity could be consistent with the Trading Strategies as put forward by the Traders.
We have throughout sought to assess the plausibility of the explanations which have been put forward by Mr Urra, Mr Sheth and Mr Lopez and the Authority by reference to all of the evidence which is available and taking account of the information that is no longer available.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions