UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Mr Kasapis
Mr Kasapis
Mr Kasapis is an experienced expert witness and is a Senior Director at Kroll Advisory (“Kroll”). Prior to joining Kroll in 2017 he had worked at Rabobank, KPMG and National Australia Bank, and had experience in a range of financial products. He has significant expertise in analysing trading data.
However, as Mr Kasapis acknowledged, he had no relevant trading experience himself, with no experience of market making in EGBs (or any bond market). Where he expressed his opinion by reference to his experience, the Tribunal was not satisfied that he had the requisite relevant experience, and certainly not such as would substantiate the opinions he expressed. By way of example:
In the Summary of his expert report for the Tribunal Mr Kasapis said:
“With respect to the placement of these orders away from the touch, in my view a larger order offset to the touch would have meant that the order would be given much less consideration by other market participants compared to if those larger orders were placed on the touch (with zero offset to the touch). In my experience, traders focus much more on orders placed on the touch rather than offset two or three cents behind the touch (in a highly liquid market, as this was, the bid ask spread will be narrow as the market is highly competitive, therefore bids and offers would be aggressive and narrow the spread). Orders placed offset to the touch will in my experience be ignored by market participants, as would have been the case with the larger orders within the Specified Instances.”
Addressing the placing of multiple orders by Mr Sheth:
“In my experience of managing desks with junior traders, this explanation is plausible, and it is not an unusual error.”
Most of Mr Kasapis’s evidence was based on his analysis of the trading data. Mr Shivji criticised various aspects of Mr Kasapis’s approach, in particular the assumptions made in the context of his “Other Participant Trade Analysis” which Mr Shivji submitted were unrealistic and overstated the “immediate liquidity” at the time of the Large Orders, and the averaging approach used in the “Market Trend Analysis” which smoothed out price fluctuations.
The Tribunal considers that there were flaws in the approach adopted to analysing data (including rounding of time intervals where actual timings of traded volumes were available, and averaging of price movements) but nevertheless have found some of Mr Kasapis’s presentation of the data helpful. This included his identification (or confirmation of data which had been presented to him) of data relating to the trading activity in the Instances, in particular the Overlapping Small Orders and the amendments to Large Orders after the Small Order traded.
There were areas where Mr Shivji criticised the scope of the work which had been done by Mr Kasapis, submitting that he had gone beyond the role of an expert in producing a list of cash bond orders relating to Specified Instances for Mr Urra and Mr Sheth which had not been identified or relied upon by the Traders (and some of which were then denied or doubted by them). Whilst there was a clear error in this exercise, separate from whether the Traders agreed the cash transactions were relevant, in that Mr Kasapis had, for F67 (a Specified Instance for Mr Sheth) identified a cash bond trade with Banca Aletti without recognising that this was a split trade and thus failing to refer to the other leg of the trade in the other direction, the scope of the exercise undertaken was clear and we consider that Mr Kasapis was permitted to undertake this exercise; his report explained that this was his own identification of cash trades (in contrast to other sections where he set out that material had been provided to him and he had checked it and then put forward his opinions).
Mr Shivji was particularly critical of Mr Kasapis’s report where he produced graphs to show that two very large trades (of 7,540 lots and 3,242 lots) in 2017 had traded without there being an impact on the market to move the price towards the opposite side, submitting that he had sought to pass off material that had been given to him by his client (Mr Urra) as his own independent analysis and had not sought to verify the information given to him.
The Tribunal accepts that Mr Kasapis had not questioned or verified this information and did not in fact have the underlying data; and the Tribunal considered that the subsequent correspondence with the Authority following the Authority asking for the underlying data is unclear. However, the Tribunal does not accept that the presentation of this data in Mr Kasapis’s two reports to the Tribunal was misleading - there is no reference to the source of the data in those reports (whether Eurex or otherwise) and the footnote simply says “the data for which I was provided and assume to be accurate”; he does state that these examples had been produced in his first report. That is a reference to his report dated 12 November 2021 before the RDC, where (in section 4.3.5) he stated “I have been provided with…” without further explanation. This criticism as to the presentation of these trades is a separate issue from whether Mr Kasapis should then have addressed the possibility that these trades were block trades (reported after execution) or roll trades.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions