Estoppel
Estoppel
It is necessary therefore to consider TCS’s case on estoppel. To establish estoppel by convention, TCS must show the following:
A common assumption shared by both parties or an assumption made by TCS and acquiesced in by DBS: see Tinkler v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2021] UKSC 39; [2021] 3 WLR 697 per Lord Burrows JSC at [39].
If there is said to have been a common assumption, TCS must show that it was communicated between the parties, i.e. it must have crossed the line. A common subjective assumption is insufficient. See Tinkler at [34]-[38].
The person raising the estoppel (here, TCS) must know that the person against whom the estoppel is raised (here, DBS) shares the common assumption and must be strengthened, or influenced, in its reliance on that common assumption by that knowledge; and DBS must (objectively) intend, or expect, that that will be the effect on TCS of its conduct crossing the line so that one can say that DBS has assumed some element of responsibility for TCS’ reliance on the common assumption. See Tinkler at [51].
Alternatively, an estoppel by convention based on acquiescence can only exist where the parties are subjectively in agreement; i.e. the party making the representation knows that the other party has a different understanding: ABN Amro Bank NV v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc & Ors [2021] EWCA Civ 1789; [2022] 1 WLR 1773 per Sir Geoffrey Vos MR at [87].
The relevant common assumption is that there was no longer a requirement to serve an exception Report within 5 Working Days.
For the same reason that I reject the submission that the communication of 2 August 2016 could, of itself, objectively be construed as agreeing to TCS’ request for permission for an extension within which to serve the draft Exception Report, it is insufficient, taken alone, to be a communication of the alleged common assumption.
However, the case relating to common assumption relies upon all the conduct of the parties in the weeks and months that follow including the various negotiations between the parties in efforts to resolve their disputes commercially.
There were two relevant streams of communications between the parties following the exchange referred to above. The first was a joint exercise in replanning, which was a necessary exercise in its own right and also one which related (a) to the provision of an exception report by TCS and (b) to the second stream of communications which related to the commercial implications.
Mr Kuncheria of TCS, who was at the time Chief Accountable Officer for the DBS ‘Programme’, and whose evidence I accept in this regard as entirely credible, stated that at this time TCS’s and DBS’s focus remained on the re-planning of the Programme and that for both TCS, and to his mind DBS, the importance of this re-planning superseded the importance of the serving of the draft Exception Report when possible. This was borne out by the contemporaneous documents. By way of example, on 16 August 2016, the Commercial Forum Dashboard stated:
‘A joint re-planning exercise is underway. It is anticipated that the revised plan will be agreed by R1 Project Board on 25th August 2016. This will then inform discussions around the commercial impacts’.
Re-planning related to both R1 B&B and R1-D, the former having a knock on effect to the latter. Mr Evans, of DBS, accepted in evidence that at this time once the plan was in place, everyone would be able to work out the impacts and there would be a commercial discussion. Mr Kuncheria said, which I accept:
‘We all focussed on regulating the position by re-planning and then we would know that the consequences of the delays were – and would in fact have already sorted them out. We could then serve the Exception Report. ….There is no doubt that [DBS] knew we needed specific information to complete the draft Exception Report that DBS could not readily provide, and the process we were all embarked upon was a collaborative one to ascertain and understand when all parties could complete the relevant tasks so that an effective-plan for delivery could be prepared. I also do not recall any occasion on which DBS asserted, prior to the service of the draft Exception Report, that TCS would not be entitled to compensation for the delays described in the Notice of Delay because it had not served the draft Exception Report within five working days.’
I also accept the evidence of Mr Kuncheria that the information being provided to TCS from HPE (effectively through DBS) was a moving feast at this time. In cross-examination, he said, which I accept:
‘So I think even when we were trying to do the replanning, you will find that in a period of three to four or five months, each of the elements of delivery from the delivery partners, like HPE, were shifting 12, 15, 16 times. So we could not – it’s a moving feast. We just couldn’t pinpoint in terms of any of those details that is required, because for an Exception Report in our mind to be complete, we need to give some kind of a realistic assumption in terms of when these partners can deliver, based on which, when we can deliver the final outcome. And every time we prepare one, we find that they come back in the next week or session and give us a delay which is again further on. So we find multiple iterations coming from all the time. So we couldn’t collate it in any sensible shape or form, because from one reporting period to the other, so many delays are happening, so we couldn’t have a feel. Even though, again, that’s a frustration I would have in my witness statement is that we want to do it and we have expressed with DBS that we would like these teams to come together to help us prepare to do it, but it – it just doesn’t happen.’
In parallel with the re-planning exercise, it is clear from the evidence that the parties were also in commercial negotiations in relation to the delays that had occurred, and that these were linked to the production of an Exception Report. On 19 September 2016, for example, Colette Owen, who was DBS’s Head of Commercial, advised the Commercial Forum (as reflected in the minutes) that exception and correction plans would be required to inform commercial negotiations. There was no suggestion that the Exception Report, if delivered, was out of time so that there was no entitlement to negotiate. Similarly, on 22 September 2016, Adele Downey of DBS, in an email to a number of senior DBS financial and commercial people involved in the project, provided a draft of her ‘script’ to be used in the negotiations with TCS. This included, ‘Delay cannot be attributable to a single party’ and ‘Reach a deal that costs no more than £11m or 5 months deferred ticket price reduction’ (i.e. financial compensation moving from DBS to TCS), and no suggestion, even as a negotiating strategy, that TCS had no entitlement because the Exception Report had not been provided within 5 Working Days in accordance with Clause 5.3 of the Agreement.
DBS argues that there was no assumption made by TCS that DBS would not rely on Clauses 5.1-5.3 as a condition precedent. I reject its submissions in this regard for the following reasons:
DBS claims that there are no contemporaneous documents before the Court which record TCS making such an assumption and nothing in the internal TCS correspondence on the topic of Exception Reporting to suggest that DBS believed that DBS would not rely upon the clauses. However, the whole tenor of the communications, in circumstances where DBS themselves did not articulate any reliance upon the provisions at the time, is that the condition precedent was simply not a live point. It is unsurprising that it was not the subject of discussion internally within TCS. It is objectively obvious that TCS considered that it had had a de facto extension to provide its Exception Report, notwithstanding the absence of a formal response to their request, because of the way DBS was conducting itself in discussions and negotiations;
DBS placed weight, in cross-examination and in submissions, on the internal emails from Mr Murphy (of TCS) drawing the relevant contractual terms to the attention of his colleagues which may be said to have emphasised the potential importance of the clauses in late July 2016. There is no suggestion that TCS were unaware of the clauses: these emails make clear that they were aware of the wording of Clause 5.3. The emails also make clear, for what it is worth, that TCS genuinely considered that the production of an Exception Report that detailed the consequences of the delay was not possible in light of their dependency upon information from others (and in particular HPE, through DBS). The very fact that TCS were acutely aware of the possible point that DBS might take against them supports their belief that the point had fallen away in circumstances where substantive negotiations and planning was taking place absent any suggestion by DBS that they had forfeited their entitlement to compensation. The internal emails from Mr Murphy do not, therefore, negate in any way the existence of the assumption relied upon;
Mr Kuncheria was right to concede that no formal extension was ever granted. It is obvious that it was not, as I have found above. Indeed, had it been, the issue of estoppel would not arise. The concession was not of itself inconsistent with an estoppel existing;
I do not accept that Mr Kuncheria’s evidence (or that of other more junior TCS employees) does not support the assumption asserted. Whilst he does not use the phrase, ‘I assumed…’, his evidence (in the passages quoted above) and the correspondence surrounding the substance of the discussions and negotiations clearly demonstrate an assumption on TCS’ part that, whilst it was still necessary to produce an Exception Report, no technical point on 5 Working Days was being taken against it and that any entitlement would be determined in light of the substantive merits.
DBS also contends that it did not share or acquiesce in an assumption that it would not rely upon the terms of Clauses 5.1-5.3. This is not right. The following exchanges in evidence with senior DBS witnesses made clear that DBS was both prepared to extend time for the draft Exception Report (knowing that the 5 Working Days had passed) and, importantly, that DBS considered at a senior level that the 5 Working Day requirement had fallen away:
Ms Owen’s oral evidence, which I accept in this regard, was that her response of 2 August 2016 did not agree an alternative period in which the draft Exception Report could be provided. This is consistent with the conclusion I have come to above. However, her evidence was also, in summary, that (a) she understood TCS were saying that they did not have sufficient information to do so; (b) at least one of her colleagues considered this to be reasonable; (c) she had not refused the request and would have said so if she had; and (d) DBS was prepared to grant TCS more than 5 days even though the parties never came to any agreement on what the period was (Day 9/130):
Q. You were asked in writing by TCS for an extension of time. You -- and they said that, "We need an extension of time because we need information to prepare our exception report", okay? David Charles says to you, after looking at what you had cut and pasted and sent on to him, that this seems reasonable.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay? You then adopt his answer to your email and you go back and you provide some of the information, but not all of it.
A. Yes.
Q. So you knew that they still required information in order to prepare an exception report?
A. Yes.
Q. And you hoped that what had been provided would at least help in some way toward preparing the exception report?
A. Yes.
Q. And that the information that would be imparted or whatever, or gleaned by TCS at the R1 PB meeting the following day would also help to supplement and provide information for them to prepare the exception report?
A. Yes.
Q. So it follows, doesn't it, that you didn't go back to them and say, "No, you're not getting an extension of time"?
A. No, I never -- I never said that, no.
Q. But you see, if you weren't prepared to grant an extension of time and that's one of the things that was being sought, then you would have said that, wouldn't you, in your response?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And you didn't?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. So it follows that you were prepared to allow them to have more than five days?
A. Yes, which we can do.
…
Q…So the issue was not: are we going to prepare an exception report? It's, and it remained: when will we have sufficient information to be able to do so? Is that fair?
A. That was TCS's position, yeah.
Q. Yes, that's right. Okay. But whether or not DBS agreed with it, DBS had in fact granted the five-day exception -- extension. I appreciate you didn't write a letter saying, "Yes, you can have an extension", because the conduct of the parties after that date was all on the basis of well, you still wanted an exception report, they, TCS, were going to provide you with one, but they were still asking for information. That's a fair summary of the position, isn't it?
A. They kept asking for information, we kept reminding them that the exception report was still outstanding, but we didn't -- we didn't agree a final date that they -- they should have as an extension, that's correct.
Mr Whiting was, at the relevant time, Director for Finance, with additional responsibility for DBS’s Commercial operations. Mr Whiting was taken through a number of documents which dealt with commercial negotiations in the autumn of 2016, and he generally agreed that DBS did not take any point that no Exception Report had been served with 5 Working Days and/or that as a result TCS were not entitled to bring a claim. He gave evidence that the first time he could remember seeing the 5 Working Days point being taken by DBS was in the pleadings. In this context, the following exchange then took place (Day 8/20):
Q. Yes. Well, I suggest it's obvious and the fact is this, that nowhere in [Colette Owen’s 2 August 2016 email], which of course, as you say, you saw, nowhere in the document does it say you are not having an extension of time, does it?
A. Not from what I've seen today, no.
Q. No. So, you see, one explanation for your conduct in never mentioning the five days point, as I will call it, and deploying that in your commercial negotiations that you were having with Mr Kuncheria in these many meetings that you had is because in fact the five business days aspect had just fallen by the wayside, hadn't it? Not the provision of an exception report, but the five business days?
A. Yes
I find that DBS and TCS shared precisely the same assumption: both parties were working on the basis that the 5 day condition precedent had fallen away.
This is not a case of acquiescence by nothing more than silence. Contrary to the submissions of DBS, the evidence clearly shows that the entire landscape of discussions, which included the knock on effect to R1-D, between the parties was predicated on the basis that:
there was a continuing requirement on the part of DBS and acceptance on the part of TCS that an Exception Report setting out the consequences of the claimed delays was required;
TCS was bringing a claim for financial compensation for delays caused by HPE (and, in TCS’s eyes, therefore, DBS);
information for the process was required from HPE, through DBS, and the provision of that information was ongoing both for the purposes of re-planning the project and (therefore) to articulate the consequences of the delays within an Exception Report;
it was worthwhile for both parties to engage at length in discussion and negotiation of the merits of the parties’ positions in circumstances where DBS was not asserting that TCS’s right to compensation had fallen away because of a failure to have served a draft Exception Report within 5 Working Days.
DBS had not reserved its position in any way. Moreover, through the actions of its senior commercial officers, DBS acted (entirely properly) in a manner consistent with the actual understanding of those officers that, in light of the exchange at the beginning of August 2016 and their own involvement in providing to TCS information required (from HPE), the 5 Working Day requirement had fallen by the wayside, even if there was no clear agreement replacing the period by some other defined date. In reliance on DBS’s conduct, TCS expended resources, committed to negotiating a commercial deal, and acted to its detriment further in that, as TCS submits, it was denied the opportunity to decide how it might respond faced with continuing and accruing costs that, contrary to its belief, DBS had no intention of paying because of a technical notice point.
Applying these facts to the test of estoppel, it is clear that the parties were subjectively in agreement. It is objectively obvious that TCS considered that it had had a de facto extension to provide the Exception Report, notwithstanding the absence of a formal response to their request, because of the way DBS was conducting itself in discussions and negotiations. It is also clear, on DBS’s own evidence, that it also considered that the 5 Working Day requirement had ‘fallen by the wayside’. It would have been obvious to DBS that TCS was engaging in the project in a way, to DBS’s benefit, that it may not have done faced with a denial of entitlement to compensation based on the 5 Working Day point. Insofar as it is necessary for me to do so, I also find in the specific circumstances known to the parties (and in particular as set out in (1) to (4) above), a reasonable person in TCS’s position would have expected DBS acting responsibly would have put TCS on notice that its position was that (without prejudice to the ongoing commercial negotiations) it considered that TCS had entirely forfeited its right to compensation for delay (see Ted Baker Plc v Axa Insurance UK Plc [2017] EWCA Civ 4097).
In these circumstances, DBS is now estopped from arguing that TCS has no entitlement to compensation for delay on account of its failure to comply with Clause 5.3.
The Parties’ Claims relating to Delay
- Heading
- CONTENTS
- IntroductiON
- The Factual Witnesses
- Expert Evidence
- Programming Experts
- Forensic Accounts
- The Parties Submissions
- Principles Applicable to Issues of Construction
- The Defendant’s Obligations and Responsibilities
- Clause 15
- Clause 9.5 which states
- Clause 14.5 of Schedule 2-6 which states
- The Delay and Notice Provisions
- Clause 7
- Conditions Precedent: Clauses 5 and 6
- Conditions Precedent: the authorities
- Clause 5.6
- Clause 6
- Clause 8
- Limitations of Liability
- A single or multiple caps?
- The Delay Damages cap under Clause 52.2.5
- Is TCS’s claim for loss of anticipated costs savings excluded by Clause 52?
- Compliance with Clause 5.3, Agreement and Estoppel Introduction
- Express Agreement
- Estoppel
- Introduction
- R1 B&B Delays
- Mr Britton’s First Analysis
- Mr Britton’s Second Analysis
- Conclusion on Mr Britton’s Analyses
- TCS’s submission based upon Mr Jardine’s analysis
- Responsibilities for Delay on the ‘Infrastructure’ Critical Path
- R1-D
- Compliance with Notice Provisions
- Analysis of Delays
- Up to August 2017
- From August 2017 to 19 September 2018
- Analysis
- Failed to confirm its desired functional scope of R1 Disclosure in relation to the Customer-to-Business portal and Accountable Officer’s Update Service functionality. Such confirmation was a prerequis
- Failed to make available an end-to-end test environment for the Interactive Voice Response system
- Failed to agree upon a data migration approach, without which the Claimant could not complete the build of a data migration environment so that anonymised data could be made available for testing
- Failed to ensure that relevant external stakeholders were available to participate in Final Systems Integration Testing
- Partial Termination
- TCS’s Claims
- Non-Manpower Costs
- Anticipated Cost Savings
- Summary of TCS’s Delay Claim Recovery
- DBS’s Claims
- Delay Payments
- R1-B&B Delay
- Disclosure Scotland Extension Costs – Item 1 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- Loss of Anticipated Savings – Item 3 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- R1-D Delay
- R0 Licence Costs – Item 4 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- R0 Hosting and Infrastructure Costs - Item 5 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- R0 Technology Refresh – Item 6 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- R0 N-1 Sustainment Costs – Item 7 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- R0 Maintenance Costs – Item 8 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- Savings
- Introduction
- Quality-related Obligations
- Good Industry Practice and Defects
- Digital by Default Standards
- Section 71
- The Basics Portal
- Section 73
- The Barring Portal
- Section 75
- Section 76
- Barring Portal: Loss of productivity - Item 11 of the Updated Schedule of Loss
- LPF Portal
- Siebel Useability Issues
- Redaction
- Document naming, bundle creation and performance
- Adobe Licence (Item 20)
- Document Storage (Item 21)
- Other B1 Barring Quality Issues
- Scan on Demand
- Special Characters
- Letters
- Item 24 : Loss of Efficiency Claims arising out of R1 Barring Quality/Useability Issues
- N-1 Sustainment Costs
- Causation and Loss
- Exit/Service Transfer
- Identification of all services (3.2.2)
- Knowledge Transfer (3.2.6 and 3.2.7)
- Section 95
- Providing all documentation to a replacement contractor (3.2.1 and 3.2.10)
- The identification of all leases, maintenance agreement and support agreements in connection with the provision of the services (3.2.3)
- Providing any other information or assistance reasonably required by a replacement contractor (3.2.14)
- Causation and Loss
- The Security Incidents
- The Charges Variation Dispute Introduction
- Issue 1: How the amount of an ‘over-recovery of the Forecast Revenue’ (Clause 2.8.4) or ‘under-recovery of the Forecast Revenue’ (Clause 2.8.5) is to be measured
- Section 104
- Issue 4: How Clause 2.8.5 of Schedule 2-3 applied to Volume Based Service Charges in Service Year 5
- Issue 2: Whether the Predicted Volumes for Basics in Service Year 4 were 1,000,000 (TCS’s case) or 320,374 (DBS’s case)
- Conclusion on Volume Based Service Charge
- Conclusions
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